

Data Generation and Sanitisation in Security-Sensitive Systems


Rob Flood



Background

- In certain domains, it is extremely difficult to train machine learning systems using datasets drawn directly from real-world distributions
- Particularly true for security applications of ML — privacy concerns for individuals and organisations
- Public benchmark datasets consist of artificially generated or (heavily) redacted data
- Difficulty in obtaining data limits classifier robustness due to need for constant updates
- Challenges:
 1. Evaluating the quality of synthetic data
 2. Generating synthetic data
 3. Sanitising data whilst maintaining utility






$\Delta(\text{Performance, Evaluation}) \sim \Delta(\text{Synthetic/Sanitised, Real World})$





Evaluating Synthetic Network Traffic Datasets

- DARPA '98, KDD Cup '99 spurred research into intrusion detection
- Superseded by NSL-KDD and then by CIC-IDS '17, UNSW NB15
- These datasets still have obvious flaws:
 - Lack of traffic variety
 - Poor attack realism
 - Simulation artifacts
 - Shoddy construction
- Currently, attempting to systematise a methodology for evaluating the quality of network traffic datasets




IAT Distribution



Network Data Generation - DetGen



- DetGen – ‘Deterministic’ network traffic generation using containers
- Can generate traffic with accurate ground truth with control over many traffic features
 - Protocol
 - Congestion
 - Packet loss
 - Corruption
 - Duplication
- Have seen success in using DetGen to produce realistic network traffic¹
- Currently, porting to Mininet for realistic topology emulation; chaining together scenarios



1: Traffic generation using containerization for machine learning. Dynamics 2019, Henry Clausen, Robert Flood & David Aspinall




LSTM-model activity classification




Data Sanitisation

- GDPR/DPA recommend certain pseudonymisation/anonymisation methods such as k-anonymity/differential privacy
- Domain experts often choose what data to obfuscate on an ad hoc basis
- Questions emerge when multiple parties with differing privacy policies interact with one another
- Want to encapsulating this process as an 'Anonymisation Policy' – collation of data, data shared amongst multiple parties ...
- Want these policies to have certain properties: composition, hierarchy ...



Data Sanitisation – AnonLens (WIP)

- Idea: Given an operation from a Database to a 'View' (*get*), automatically derive a reverse operation mapping a View to a Database (*put*) – a lens
- At a high-level, similar to the problem of producing many anonymised versions of some source data – treat anonymisation functions as *gets*
- Maintain consistency across a variety of views thanks to lens laws
- Can be easily expressed, composed in manner that maintains lens laws
- Modification of data explicitly defined in a functional manner
 - Reverse operation (deanonymisation) easy to derive in a fully auditable manner
 - Many of the measurements we need to derive policy properties gotten for 'free'



Thank You

